Faith From Without and Within

In Hilchot Tshuva 3:7 the Rambam defines the Min, one of the categories of sinners halacha 3:6 states will not receive the world to come. In general, we know a Min is one who denies fundamental tenets of Judaism. The Rambam’s point, in Halacha 7, is to clarify exactly which beliefs the Min denies. He lists four abstracts concepts: denial of the existence of God, a ruling force, a manhig, in the world; denial of God’s Oneness; denial of God’s in-corporeality; and denial of God as the fundamental existence, i.e. an existence not preceded by any other. The fifth definition of a Min is described in action—as one who uses an intermediary to relate with God. Theoretically, what the Rambam is doing here is simply the flip side of what he did in the beginning of Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah. There the Rambam was listing what one must believe; here he is listing what one must not believe. But do the two lists line up?

  • The first tenet, which when denied creates a Min, is the belief that there is a God who is the present ruler of the world. This concept is mentioned in 1:5 of Yesodei Hatorah.
  • The next tenet mentioned in Hilchot Tshuvah is that God is one, followed by the belief that God does not have a body. Belief in these two principles, in this order, is found in Yesodei Hatorah 1:6-8.
  • The fourth tenet, the belief that God was not preceded by any other existence, is actually the first halacha in Yesodei Hatorah, and is called there the foundation of all foundations.
  • The commandment not to use an intermediary to reach God, the act which is the fifth definition of a min, is not found in Yesodei Hatorah, but in Hilchot Avodah Kochavim 1:2.
When we compare the lists, we see one of the major discrepancies between them involves the order in which the tenets are presented.[1] In Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah we are told the fundamental belief of Judaism is that God is unprecedented. All things, we are told, depended on Him for their inception[2]; He is dependent on nothing. This belief is followed by the belief that God is the Manhig of the world. In Hilchot Tshuva, this order is reversed.

This is only significant, however, because in neither place is the order arbitrary. In Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah, the first belief is called the foundation of all foundations. First one must believe that God caused reality; the belief that God sustains reality follows from that. In Hilchot Tshuva, Rambam presents the doubts of the Min in a progressive fashion. This implies the Rambam is working with an assumption that denial of God as Manhig implies denial of the rest of the list, but the rest of the list does not imply denial of God as Manhig. It follows from this that one could believe in God as the Manhig, but deny the truth of God as the fundamental existence. Therefore, in Hilchot Tshuva, the belief that God sustains reality is treated as foundation and predecessor to the belief that God caused reality.

While we now have one dilemma, because Rambam presents two different hierarchies of faith, we can also ask, regarding either list, why does one tenet rest on the other at all? The fact that God caused reality and the fact that God is currently sustaining reality are both essential dogmas in Judaism, and, theoretically, one could believe in either one while doubting the other. If both are necessary and if denial of either is heretical, why present them in a specific order, and why change that order when discussing a doubter as opposed to a believer?

In Hilchot Tshuva we are discussing one who doubts religious facts and thereby has a non-religious worldview. In simplest terms, this is someone who looks at the world and sees randomness; he is the exact opposite of Avraham Avinu, who looked at the world and saw order. Only once someone concedes that there is some power ruling the world, some manhig, do we have potential for faith. This is why the denial of God as Manhig, is the most basic doubt.

  • See Hilchot Avodah Kochavim 1:3. The first religious realization of Avraham Avinu is the realization that the world runs through the power of a manhig. This supports our assertion that, experientially, this is the first movement of faith.

In Hilchot Yesodei Hatorah, the Rambam is not discussing the experience of coming to belief. He is explaining the theology of Judaism and the dogmas on which it stands. Of course one who believes in Judaism believes that God is both the cause of existence and the present day Manhig of the world. Furthermore, both beliefs set up a dependency between man and God. However, the fact that God is the Manhig does not provide an explanation for why we should be bound to the rule of God. Without an answer to this question, belief is immature and pagan in nature. Only the fact that God is our source, not just our sustainer, properly positions God as the absolute rightful ruler of the world; nobody can deny the creator of a game the right to determine its rules. Only by viewing God as the absolute and rightful ruler of the world is Judaism sustained. Proper belief rests upon understanding God is our cause. However, belief itself rests upon recognizing God is the One who sustains us.  



[1]  The other major discrepancy is that Rambam did not state in Yesodei Hatorah, in the positive, the fifth definition of a Min. Is it possible an act, reflective of a belief in intermediaries between God and man, would cause one to be classified as a Min, but the reverse of this belief, mainly that there are no intermediaries between man and God, is not a theological dogma which we are commanded to believe in, on par with all the other fundamental tenets of our faith?

[2] Some argue that Rambam stayed away from the language that describes God creating yeish m’ayin, something from nothing, in order to include within the faithful the Aristotelians who believed God’s creative act was in the forming of pre-existing matter into the universe as we know it. Even if this is so, this fundamental belief still requires one to assume matter did not pre-date God, and matter could not exist if God did not simultaneously exist. However, God could exist if this matter did not. 

© 2007 NISHMA