INSIGHT
5757 - #18
Free Choice
Bechira,
free choice, is a fundamental concept within Judaism. As Rambam,
Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Teshuva 8:1-5 points out,
without the concept of bechira, the entire nature
and purpose of Torah falters. Only because of the human
being's free choice, can we be held responsible for our
actions and thus receive reward and punishment.
Furthermore, it is only because of bechira that
the very concept of mitzvah can exist, for how
could G-d command if we did not have, through our free
choice, the possibility of listening and following the
command. Free choice, though, is a concept that is most
difficult to understand.
The
classical difficulties with free choice are the
theological ones. How can we have free choice when G-d
already knows the future and what we will do?1.How can we say that all that occurs is the
Will of G-d at the same time that we state that we choose
our behaviour?2 Factors of determinism, which also are
deemed to have merit, further raise questions on the
extent of bechira and its exact realm and specific
nature. Ra'avad, Hilchot Teshuva 8:5 raises this
issue through his question on the co-existence of the
effects of mazalot, astrology, with bechira.
In modern times, we ask this question in our search to
reconcile psychological determinism, in fact the science
of psychology, with free choice.3. Clearly, free choice cannot mean that every
possible choice is available for us; the choice must have
parameters. Yet, there must be a choice.
What, though, do we mean by this word
"choice"? If someone threatens to kill a person
unless this person signs a contract or performs a certain
deed, is that deemed a situation of choice or not for
this person? In the broadest sense of the word, there
clearly is a choice: do as is wished or die. The person
can physically choose either alternative. In a different
sense, though, we would say that this person had "no
choice" but to sign the contract or perform the
deed. Within this perspective, choice must imply some
balance between the two alternatives. It cannot be deemed
a choice if one alternative clearly would be the
selection of any rational individual. It may also not be
considered a choice if one alternative evokes a much
stronger emotional response. Accordingly, "to do as
is wished or die", for both these reasons, would not
be a choice for the option to die is not, emotionally and
rationally, an equal alternative. In applying the concept
of duress and thereby excusing the person from the
responsibility of the contract4. or the deed,5. it would seem that we are effectively
recognizing this latter perception of choice. In the case
of duress, we excuse the person because he/she had
"no choice".6.
This perception that choice must involve two
equal (or almost equal) alternatives in order to be
deemed a true choice, has an effect in our understanding
of bechira as well. It is because of this reason
that some individuals argue that the knowledge of G-d's
existence cannot be proven but must be a result of faith:
if it was absolutely clear that the mitzvot were
the Will of G-d, there would be "no choice".
What these individuals are saying is that absolute
knowledge that the mitzvot are His Will would
clearly remove the balance between the alternatives. Who
would not follow the Will of G-d? Does this mean that the
generation of the desert had no bechira?
The tochecha, warning, (Vayikra
26:3-46; Devarim 28:1-69), to many, presents a
similar challenge. In the face of these repercussions,
especially the negative ones for violations, could a
person possibly choose to transgress?
We could again return to the argument of
faith, assert that this is exactly why G-d does not
punish immediately, so that a person can doubt the truth
of the repercussions and have free choice. Remarkably,
doubt rather than allowing for punishment is actually, in
halachic terms, a defence against punishment. The
necessity for hatra'ah, a warning, before someone
can be punishable in the courts for transgressions is but
one example of this.7. And again, can we say that the generation
of the desert doubted the truth of these warnings? Bechira
means knowing full well that G-d exists and the
repercussions of our actions; we have the choice to
observe the command or transgress and suffer the
consequences. But is that "choice"?
We could answer that it is still a choice in
its broadest sense. Where do we see that bechira
means a choice between two equal alternatives as our
second definition of choice maintains? In the case of
Pharaoh, there are many who argue that G-d's hardening of
Pharaoh's heart was not a removal of free choice but
actually was intended to ensure free choice.8 Given the intensity of the plagues, without
the hardening of his heart, Pharaoh would have had
"no choice" but to let the Jewish nation leave.
Indeed, bechira would seem to involve two equal
alternatives.
We have the alternative to listen to G-d and
receive reward. We have an equal alternative, given fully
that we accept the existence of G-d and know the
punishment for transgressing, not to listen. There is a
strong drive to simply not wish to listen to G-d. That is
a drive that we must further contemplate.
Rabbi Benjamin Hecht e-mail
Notes
1. Rambam, himself,
confronts this question in halacha 5.
2. Much of Da'at
Tevunot is devoted to this question.
3. Rabbi Moshe
Halevi Spiro's various works on the topic of
psychology and Judaism, including his book entitled Judaism
and Psychology deal extensively with this issue and
are excellent starting points for this study.
4. See, further, Shulchan
Aruch, Choshen Mishpat c. 205 for the exact rules
outlining the application of the onnes, duress,
argument in commercial transactions.
5. See, further, Rambam,
Hilchot Yesodei HaTorah, c. 5 for a presentation of
the application of the onnes, duress, defense in
cases of mitzvah transgression.
6. It should be noted
that there are other possible explanations for the lack
of responsibility for decisions made under duress. We may
excuse the individual not because there was no choice but
because the choice was not fair or that the imposition of
this choice by the other was not fair.
7. See Rambam,
Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Sanhedrin 12:2. Another
example of this concept is Hilchot Mamrim 3:3.
8. See Rabbi Y.
Nachshoni, Hagot B'Parshiot HaTorah, Va'era 2 and N.
Leibowitz, Studies in Shemot, Va'era 4.
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