INSIGHT
5758 - #1
The Question of Dual Moralities
The
relationship of the Sheva Mitzvot B'nei Noach, the
Noachide Code incumbent upon all humanity, to the Taryag
Mitzvot, incumbent upon Jews, is one that demands
further investigation. On the surface, the Halachic
Code of 613 mitzvot would seem to be, simply, an
expansion upon the 7 mitzvot that bind all
Mankind. The additional mitzvot of Taryag would
seem to represent additional stringencies G-d has placed
upon the Jewish People which, while inherently
beneficial,1. demand further duties and obligations. The
general declaration in T.B. Sanhedrin 59a, that
something cannot be forbidden to a Noachide yet permitted
to a Jew, would seem to support this understanding.
Proponents of this view would seem to perceive the
relationship between the Sheva Mitzvot and Taryag
in a manner similar to the way they would view the
relationship, within Halacha, between acting lifnim
meshurat hadin, beyond the letter of the law, and
acting according to din, the law. Along the
continuum of a value construct, a standard representing a
minimum tolerable application of the value and another
standard representing a superior level of application are
identified. The Sheva Mitzvot would represent this
tolerable base level, which is demanded of all humanity. Taryag
would represent the superior level which is demanded of
Jews.2. Inherently, pursuant to this view, one
vision of morality and value constructs is postulated.
The distinction between Noachides and Jews is
quantitative: how much application of a value is to be
demanded.
As presented in my Crisis in Jewish
Identity, Part III, NISHMA Journal VI, this
perception has its difficulties. The distinction between
the Noachide Code and Taryag does not seem to be
only quantitative but also qualitative. In various
circumstances, the two seem to be demanding not only
differing value applications but conflicting
applications. An interesting example of this is the case
of judgement. According to the Noachide Code, judgement
can be rendered by one judge.3. Indeed Meshech Chochma, Parshat Noach
sees in this right to judge by oneself a positive
comparison to the One Judge. Yet within the Taryag
system, judgement by one judge is generally not allowed.
Even though there are limited cases where judgement by
one judge is allowed,4. Devarim Rabbah 1:10 further states
that judgement by one judge is incorrect precisely
because it is the province of the One Judge. These two
values are diametrically opposite to each other. The
question is not simply whether one judge should or should
not judge alone. Within the Noachide system the value of
judgement includes judgement by one judge. Within the Taryag
system the value of judgement precludes judgement by one
judge. This is not differing points upon one value
continuum. This is a projection of different value
continuums.5. The difference between the Sheva Mitzvot
and Taryag would seem to be qualitative. The two
are presenting differing value systems.
One approach in explaining the distinction
between the two systems focuses on the difference in the
authority base of the system and their projected
relationships with the Divine. Rabbi Yosef Yehuda Leib
Bloch,6. for example, argues that the authority base
of the Noachide system is a relationship with G-d similar
to the relationship between a doctor and a patient. The
base of the Jewish system, he contends, is comparable to
the relationship between a king and his nation. This
fundamental distinction in connection between the
Noachide and G-d and the Jew and G-d can colour the
entire nature of both systems and yield qualitatively
distinct directives.
Based upon different starting points for
each system, it could be argued, the Torah is creating
dual systems of morality.
An interesting argument can also be made
that the qualitative distinction is founded not on a
difference in the starting point or base of the system
but rather its purpose. The Ohr Sameach7. makes a comparison between the Noachide
system of judgement and the judgement powers of the
Jewish king. He further compares these powers to the
emergency powers of the Jewish courts to protect society.8. Law would seem to have two purposes. One is
the protection of society. The other is the development
of the individual. The focus of the Noachide system would
seem to be the former; its primary purpose is the
protection of society. Its evidentiary rules, thus, were
demarcated to meet this goal.9. The focus of Taryag, though, would
seem to be the latter; its primary focus is the
individual. What is in question is not what society needs
but the moral status of the individual and what he or she
deserves.10. As such, the evidentiary rules of the
standard Jewish court system -- two witnesses, the
appropriate warning and the appropriate number of judges
-- meet a qualitatively different standard. The differing
moral systems present different Divine objectives.
Indeed this perspective could be used to
understand distinctions in systems with Taryag as
well. Differences are not always measurable solely on the
continuum of stringency and leniency. They may represent
qualitatively different understandings, each with the
seal of the Divine.
Rabbi Benjamin Hecht e-mail
Notes
1. See T.B.
Makkot 23b. See, also, Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah
268:7, in regard to a minor who wishes to convert to
Judaism.
2. Lifnim
meshurat hadin would thus be a more superior standard
which is only binding upon selected members of the Jewish
nation as determined through the halachic process.
3. See T.B.
Sanhedrin 57b. As to whom may judge and the
parameters on this judgement, see Margoliot HaYam.
See also Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 9:14
including commentators.
4. See T.B.
Sanhedrin 5a.
5. Other examples are
presented in my Crisis in Jewish Identity article
and there are more.
6. Shiurei Da'at,
vol. 3, "Bein Yisrael L'Amim U'Bein Eretz Yisrael
L'Eretz HaAmim". See further my NISHMA Study
Materials on Kabbalat HaTorah which further
investigates this issue and presents differing views.
7. See his comments
to Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Melachim 3:10.
8. See, also, Rambam,
Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Rotze'ach 4:8,9.
9. T.B. Makkot 7a
would seem to imply that protection of society is still
also part of the goal of the standard Jewish court
system. It would be hard-pressed to understand this gemara
as applying to the emergency court power although that
would be a defense to Rabbi Shimon ben Gamliel's
challenge of Rabbi Akiva.
10. As a demonstration
of this focus, see, for example, T.B. Makkot 5a.
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