INSIGHT
5760 - #10
RESPONSIBILITY FOR OTHERS
The story
of Rachel's theft of the terafim, the idols1 of her father, as
reported in Bereishit 31:19,2 is somewhat of an enigma to the
commentators. Many details of the story are unclear. The
most difficult dilemma is the ethical evaluation of the
theft. Rashi, Bereishit 31:19 states that Rachel's
intention was to prevent her father from worshipping
idols; as Bereishit Rabbah 74:5 notes, her intent
was l'shem shamayim, for the sake of Heaven. This
implies that her actions were morally correct. Yet, in
response to Lavan's assertion that someone from Yaakov's
camp stole the terafim, Yaakov declares in Bereishit
31:32 that whoever is found with the terafim
will not live.3 Rashi explains that it was
as a result of this curse that Rachel died prematurely
along the way to Israel: While Yaakov's intent in cursing
the one with the terafim may have been built upon
very different considerations,4 nonetheless Rachel was effected by
this curse. Geresh Carmel asks the obvious
question: why should Rachel be punished through this
curse if her intent was positive? The implication of
Rachel's death and its connection to this curse is that
Rachel's actions in stealing the terafim reflected
some moral problem. Thus we face the ethical dilemma of
the commentators: was the theft of the terafim a
positive act or a negative act?
One approach in solving this dilemma is to challenge
Rashi's assertion that Rachel stole the terafim in
order to prevent her father from worshipping them. Ibn
Ezra argues that if this was Rachel's intent, she
should have buried them (discarded them,destroyed them)
along the way. Ibn Ezra thus contends that the terafim
were objects of magic and Rachel stole them to prevent
Lavan from using them to see which way Yaakov fled. While
this would still be a good intention, Rachel's
demonstrates weakness in that she does not fully rely
upon the protection of Hashem.5 Thus she was susceptible to
Yaakov's curse.
In presenting a different reason for Rachel's theft, the
implication is that if the intent was to prevent Lavan
from practicing idolatry, the theft would have been a
totally positive act. Geresh Carmel states this
explicitly arguing that generally one who acted as Rachel
did would not be susceptible to a curse.6 Rabbi Shimshon
Raphael Hirsch, Bereishit 31:32 disagrees. He states
that even if Yaakov knew of Rachel's theft, he would not
have condoned it. According to this view, while Rachel's
intent may have been positive, her action in actually
stealing the terafim had negative moral
consequences. Thus she was susceptible to Yaakov's curse.
At issue may be the question of chet b'shvil
she'yizkeh chaveircha, whether one should commit a
minor sin in order to prevent another from transgressing
a major sin. T.B. Shabbat 4a seems to answer
conclusively that one should not commit the minor sin to
prevent a major transgression by another. Tosfot, d.h.
V'ki, however, shows that the matter is not so easily
resolved. When the major sin concerns idolatry,7 especially when
the minor sin may prevent a life of idolatry, the issue
becomes even more complex. Those who disagree with Rashi
may contend that theft in order to prevent idolatry is
justifiable; thus the need to present other explanations
for Rachel's motivation. Those who maintain Rashi's view
may believe that there is still something wrong with
Rachel violating the sin of theft although it was
intended to prevent the greater violation of idolatry.
The famous story of Avraham Avinu's shattering of
his father's idols8 may present a problem for the
latter view. If it was wrong for Rachel to prevent
idolatry by stealing Lavan's idols, why was it not
similarly wrong for Avraham to destroy his father's
idols?9 A distinction
between destroying and stealing idols could be attempted.10 Another
possibility, in a more theoretical and non-Halachic
realm, is that Avraham's intention was to teach his
father the truth, not simply to prevent his incorrect
action. Rachel intention was to control Lavan's ability
to perform idolatry;11 Avraham wished to
touch Terech's mind.
Rashi, Bereishit 31:33 states that Rachel was a mishamshanit,
one who touches everything. Such a person does not
understand the boundaries between individuals. In the
moral realm, such a person believes that it is his or her
duty to affect another's moral behaviour in any way. The
right of the other to contemplate and to decide a matter
is inconsequential. The other's will is ignored; the
advancement of moral propriety by whatever means
possible, even through manipulation, is the determined
course of action. Avraham, in contrast, teaches. It is
not enough to prevent transgression; he wishes the other
to understand the inappropriateness of such behaviour and
to decide to abandon this path. Avraham recognizes that
the true advancement of morality can only be achieved
with the recognition of the other's right and ability to
exercise that which makes us created in God's image: our
will to decide. We are responsible for others but in the
fulfillment of this responsibility, we must respect the
other as another thinking self.12
Rabbi Benjamin Hecht e-mail
Notes
1 For a further
discussion on the correct meaning of terafim, see Ibn
Ezra and Ramban. For our purposes the
translation of idols will suffice.
2 The story further
plays out in the concluding section of this chapter
beginning with Bereishit 31:30.
3 As the verse
states, Yaakov did not know that Rachel took the terafim..
4 HaEmek Davar,
for example, explains that Yaakov thought that anyone
stealing these idols did so with the intention of using
them in the practice of idolatry and thus deserved to die
for this infraction. On the effect of a righteous
person's curse even beyond its intention, see T.B.
Makkot 11a,b and Moed Katan 18a. It must still
be recognized that, notwithstanding the extended effect
of such a curse as presented in these sections of the gemara,
if retribution is totally inappropriate, the curse is
nullified.
5 See also R.
Yehuda Nachshoni, Hagot B'Parshiot HaTorah, Vayetze 4.
6 Geresh Carmel thus
contends that it was specifically Rachel who was open for
punishment for such a theft. For his explanation as to
why Rachel's situation was unique, see Geresh Carmel,
Bereishit 31:32.
7 See Shulchan
Aruch, Orach Chaim 306:14 and 328:10 with
commentaries. See also Aruch HaShulchan, Orach Chaim
306:28.
8 See Bereishit
Rabbah 38:13.
9 In regard to
whether destroying property is a transgression for a Ben
Noach, see Encyclopedia Talmudit 3:355.
10 For a Jew, there
is a specific mitzvah to destroy idolatry. See Chinuch,
mitzvah 436. We may question whether this mitzvah
applies to a Ben Noach.
11 See, however, Torah
Moshe, Bereishit 31:19
12 While a beit
din's right and obligation to force one to perform mitzvot
may be perceived as challenging this concept, this right
must be understood within its societal context and thus
represents a different focus.
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