INSIGHT 5767 - #08 IDEALISM AND PRAGMATISM
The disagreement between Yaakov Avinu and his
sons, Shimon and Levi – as presented in Bereishit
34:30-31 -- on the surface seems to reflect the
classic confrontation between the idealist and the
pragmatist.2 Yaakov’s critique of his
sons’ actions seems to be solely based on the
potential negative consequences that may ensue. His
response is practical; his argument is simply that this
behaviour may lead to further problems. Shimon and Levi’s
response to the criticism of their father, in turn, is
simply a re-statement of the ideal. Their actions
reflected what was needed to be done in order to right,
as much as possible, the terrible crime that was
committed against their sister. It would seem that there
was no disagreement in regard to the facts. Shimon and
Levi do not respond by challenging Yaakov’s
assessment of the situation. Shimon and Levi, it would
seem, knew as much as Yaakov knew, that there could be
dire consequences for acting as they did in destroying
Shechem. Similarly, Yaakov does not seem to disagree with
his sons’ assessment of what justice required in
this matter. It would seem that Yaakov agreed with this
pure evaluation of the appropriate punishment to fit the
crime. The argument indeed would seem to have been a
classic case of the confrontation of idealism and
pragmatism. Yaakov contends that it would have been
better to have considered the potential harmful
consequences and not carry out the ideal response of
justice. This is the way of the pragmatist – to
consider the effects of a specific behaviour in
determining the propriety of such behaviour. Shimon and
Levi disagree, contending that proper behaviour must find
actualization regardless of the consequence. This is the
way of the idealist – to consider what is proper
without concern for effects.
In Bereishit 49:5-7, though, Yaakov’s tone
changes. No longer does he attack his sons’
behaviour based on pragmatic considerations but rather in
direct terms. He now declares this behaviour to be
motivated by anger and personal will; it was, as such,
inherently incorrect, not just wrong in consideration of
the potential results. The machloket,
disagreement, between Yaakov and his two sons now shifts
in its basic essence. There is no indication that Shimon
and Levi changed their perspective; they still may have
believed their actions to have been correct. Their
disagreement with their father, though, now lies in the
very nature of the ideal. Shimon and Levi believed their
behaviour to have been the proper manifestation of
justice and, as such, the right thing to do. Yaakov, on
his death bed, now contends that this behaviour was
actually the result of anger, thus not a manifestation of
an ideal but rather inherently incorrect. But could not
justice and anger co-exist? Does not the case of Pinchus,
who in his zealousness killed Zimri,1 indicate
that justice and anger can indeed co-exist? This indeed
could be Shimon and Levi’s retort to their father’s
later critique; perhaps injustice should breed anger,
they would contend, and thus their anger and behaviour
were appropriate. A careful reading of Yaakov’s
words, though, seems to indicate that Yaakov’s
contention was not solely that Shimon and Levi were wrong
because they were motivated by anger. He seems to also deem their
actions to be inherently wrong. The argument is not
longer between pragmatism and idealism but in the very
definition of the ideal. In the eyes of Shimon and Levi,
injustice should breed anger and a response of this
nature. In the eyes of Yaakov, the anger still distorted
the matter and yielded an incorrect response. But then,
what would have been, in the eyes of Yaakov, the
appropriate response? And how do we relate this machloket
in the realm of the ideal with the previous presentation
that the disagreement reflected the continuous battle
between the pragmatist and the idealist.
Ramban, Bereishit 34:13 attempts to determine what
Yaakov thought should have been done. His first
suggestion is that Yaakov originally thought that Shimon
and Levi would only go into the city to re-capture and
save Dina, perhaps also to bring justice to Shechem
himself. To this he would have acquiesced. Yet, if this
is what Yaakov would have accepted, the pragmatic
argument he presents in the verse is somewhat
problematic. Would not the people of Shechem seek
vengeance after being tricked and suffering through the
pain of this circumcision? Ramban presents another
possibility in explaining what Yaakov was thinking;
perhaps the people of Shechem would have done teshuva,
repented, and would have become God-fearing. This
perception, however, would not be substantiated by Yaakov’s
pragmatic view expressed in the wake of the attack.
Ramban, though, does quote Yaakov’s words at the end
of his life to substantiate this perspective. There would seem to be two possible ways
of understanding the change in Yaakov’s challenge of
Shimon and Levi. One is that Yaakov’s view of the
problem never changed; his argument with his sons was
always in the realm of the ideal. Yaakov, however, chose
to present a pragmatic critique in the aftermath of the
event, perhaps because he believed that Shimon and Levi
would not, at this time, hear anything else. Only later,
when there was no longer an opportunity to delay his true
idealistic critique or when he thought that his sons
would listen, did he present his true perspective. The
other possibility is that Yaakov himself did go through a
transformation in his perspective. At the time of the
event, his problem with Shimon and Levi’s behaviour
was pragmatic; only later did he develop an idealistic
critique. 3 There is actually a third
perspective that yields a different perspective on the
nature of pragmatism and idealism. Perhaps, Yaakov did
feel that Shimon and Levi’s behaviour was inherently
wrong but he could, at the moment, only articulate a
pragmatic challenge. Sometimes, it would seem, pragmatism
can also be a stage in the development of a more complete
idealism. Ramban’s second explanation of what Yaakov may have been thinking also touches upon pragmatism. Yaakov believes that the brothers should have waited to view the effect, to see if the people would have truly repented. Somehow we see this still as somewhat more idealistic than simply being concerned about the family’s welfare and potential harm. Nevertheless it is based upon the same principle of viewing not just the cause but also the effect. Idealistic pragmatism is not simply that the end justifies the means but it recognizes that the end may be a signal in our evaluation of the means. Yaakov may or may not have developed his eventual critique of his sons’ anger at the time of the event – but he still recognized that something was wrong. His critique was formulated in the realm of the practical – but it was not solely practical. The potential negative consequence resulting from Shimon and Levi’s behaviour also indicated to him that there was something idealistically amiss. Perhaps we will be attacked – could such evil emerge from a righteous act? Perhaps the people would have repented – does righteousness lead to a loss of righteousness? Perhaps the answer is sometimes yes. Perhaps, though, the pragmatic concern is to lead us to a re-evaluation of the ideal. Yaakov’s first response may have been in the realm of the practical but he then allowed this realm to cause him to consider anew the realm of the ideal – and develop his later critique of Shimon and Levi. Rabbi Benjamin Hecht e-mail Notes 1 See Bamidbar 25:1-9.
2 In regard to this machloket
between Yaakov and his sons, Shimon and Levi, see also The
Balance of Nationhood, Nishma Insight 5756-07.
Certain perspectives developed in this earlier Insight
form a foundation for the ideas developed in this
Insight. 3 This view, of course, would
be challenged by the words of the Ramban Return to top |
© 2006 NISHMA