INSIGHT 5767 - #16 KAVOD HARAV T.B. Kiddushin 32a presents a
disagreement on whether a rav, a Torah teacher or
Torah scholar, can relinquish or waive the honour due to
Torah knowledge. The essential question of this
disagreement would seem to be whether this Torah
knowledge is deemed to be this persons possession,
i.e. part of the person, or not. If ones Torah
knowledge is part of a person, one would be deemed to
have some dominion over it and thus can waive the honour
that is due. If it is not deemed to be part of the person
but rather the Torah knowledge that one possesses is
deemed to be part of the abstract concept of impersonal
Torah, one would not have the right to waive the honour
due to this knowledge. The reason for this is
straightforward. In honouring such a person, one is not
deemed to be honouring this person but rather the Torah
or, phrased differently, the office of the Torah scholar.
In stating that a rav cannot waive this honour,
one is stating that ones Torah knowledge is
distinct from the person. In stating that one can waive
this honour, one is stating that Torah knowledge is
irrevocably integrated in the very being of a person and
that one cannot separate the Torah and the person. The
result is that the person is due this honour because of
the Torah knowledge that permeates within; yet the result
is that, since one as a person should have some control
over the dynamics of personal relating, a rav, to
some extent,1 must also maintain the right to
waive this honour. Thus, because we believe that Torah
knowledge affects our very being and the very person of
the Torah scholar is different because of Torah
knowledge, the Torah scholar can relinquish this honour.
In defending the position that a Torah teacher can
relinquish this honour, the gemara quotes, as
proof, Shemot 13:21 which states that when, upon
leaving Commentators actually do make this
comparison. Yalkut Meam Loez, for
example, compares Gods actions to a king who leads
his two sons, by torch, to show them the way.4
Torah Shelaima, Shemot 13:21, notes 289-291
presents one possible way of sidestepping the question by
referring to the many commentators that understand this
verse as applying to an angel rather than God Himself.
The gemara can thus be understood as comparing the
honour due an angel, a servant of the King, to the honour
due a Torah teacher.5 The Torah
Shelaima also presents the idea that the gemara
knew it could only apply this idea to the honour due a
Torah teacher and not that due a king for a kings
honour cannot be waived. Since the verse is teaching us
that God can waive His honour, it must be referring to
the honour due as Teacher of Torah. Still, how does a
concept of God as Torah Teacher connect to the verse? Torah Temima answers his question by simply referring to the inverted case. T.B. Pesachim 108a states that the awe for ones teacher should be like the awe one has for Heaven.6 In the generic sense, the honour due our designated Torah teacher (which applies, to some extent, as a model for how we should relate to all Torah scholars), is compared to the honour due Heaven. As such, whenever we refer to the honour or awe due God, it is, in essence, of a similar nature to the honour and awe we have for the Torah scholar. This verse refers to the honour due God; basically, if stated generically, this is to be compared in the human realm to the honour due Torah teachers and scholars. This is why the gemara applies this idea to kavod harav, the honour due the Torah teacher. Perhaps, though, this also should indicate to us the nature of our basic relationship with God. God went, halach, before us; He is Our Teacher. Rabbi Benjamin Hecht e-mail Notes (1) I
have added the words to some extent for,
while the psak halacha is that a
rav can relinquish this honour
(see, Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 242:32),
as evidenced by the further discussion in this very gemara,
the decision to do so must consider the effect on the
respect for Torah. Thus, even when a rav
is mochel, relinquishes this
honour, some level of honour may still be appropriate. On
a personal note, it is always sad to read critiques of
Torah scholars who are portrayed as haughty because they
demanded honour. While one can waive ones honour
due to Torah, in determining the appropriateness of such
a decision, a rav must consider
whether the importance of Torah knowledge and its effect
on a person is thereby, through this relinquishing of
respect, not imparted to an individual. Who we respect
describes what we value. To assume that a Torah scholar
who demands respect is simply haughty reflects a lack of
recognition of the importance of Torah knowledge and its
affect on a person. To honour a Torah scholar is to
declare that one recognizes the distinction of Torah
knowledge. For many Torah scholars, it is one of the
burdens of their position that they must, in various
circumstances, demand respect even though they personally
have no interest or desire for it, because thereby they
are teaching respect for Torah knowledge. It is only
doubly painful to then hear people critique such a
decision as a result of haughtiness. Return to top |
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