At the beginning of his summation of the laws of tzara’at,¹ entitled Nega’im, which he presents at the conclusion of parshat Tazria, Rabbi Shimshon Raphael Hirsch, Vayikra 13:59 writes: “No part of God’s Torah can serve, as much as this chapter on [negaim], to show the absolute folly of the erroneous idea of “the tendency of the Laws of Moses to be rules and regulations to be enforced for health and sanitary purposes.” The general world sees these laws, with their emphasis on seclusion, as the ancient, Jewish, medical response to the disease of leprosy, advocating for combating this illness by isolating its victims. With these words, Rabbi Hirsch is emphatically declaring that this is clearly not the purpose of these laws – and that a purview of them clearly shows, with numerous examples, that the rules of tzara’at have no connection to this purpose. Of course, given the secular bias² of these theorists, these arguments may have little chance convincing these individuals of the error of their perceptions. Nevertheless, Rabbi Hirsch’s assertion may open to us a most interesting insight into this entire Torah presentation.

            The issue is not solely the cause of this affliction but our response to it. The secularist, in defining this disease medically, sees the cause of such affliction as amoral. The subsequent isolation is, thus, solely an attempt to protect the greater society. As such, those afflicted are seen as victims themselves, forced to endure this pain of isolation for the benefit of their neighbours. It is, thus, not surprising that a mystique has developed around the fate of the leper due, perhaps in part, to its perceived Biblical focus. This may be part of the reason that great moral excellence was attributed to those who attempted to assist the leper, the one whose affliction is even mentioned in the Bible. This, of course, was never a focus of those who understood the true nature of Torah.

            In defining tzara’at in spiritual terms, the affliction clearly reflected a moral consequence.³ The pain of isolation, as such, was not simply a corollary result of the necessities demanded in treating the disease but was a direct consequence of that which precipitated the disease. Tzara’at was an indication of the need to isolate a specific individual in punishment for some previous indiscretion. The focus of the study of tzara’at, thus, included the causes, the reasons, for someone to be so afflicted by God – and the focus of such investigations was on sins for which isolation would be an appropriate consequence. T.B. Arachin 16a, as such, presents seven sins for which one can be punished with tzara’at, all reflecting immoral behaviours and weaknesses that can negatively affect society.

            The lesson is clear. If one cannot act properly in a social context, the appropriate consequence is isolation, removal from the social framework. What is most significant, though, is the breadth of this gemara’s understanding of what can be the cause of social disorder, all appropriately punishable with isolation. Three general categories seem to emerge from a perusal of these seven items. Obviously, direct attacks upon another -- such as loshon hara, murder, perjury and theft -- challenge the social fabric and a response of isolation to be imposed upon such a perpetrator is understandable. If one cannot act properly towards his/her fellow, segregation from interacting with others is an appropriate response. Overextended concern with oneself – as evidenced in the expressions of haughtiness or stinginess – also can be seen as a further cause of social discord. Society demands that one balance his/her own desires and interests with those of his/her fellow. One too filled with self, especially without any concern for another, can be a pariah on the social order. It is not only actions that can directly harm another but also feelings that can lead one to overlook the other that must face the consequence of isolation.

            Concern for the causes of social discord leads us to focus on matters which generally include harm to another. The inclusion of gilui arayot, sexual impropriety, in this list, though, adds a different dimension. Sexual impropriety does not necessarily imply harm to another, the perceived base of social discord. In that both parties usually share the desire, consent between the parties in a sexual sin, and thus the lack of one directly harming the other, would seem to imply that the concern in legislating against such behaviour is not social discord. The inclusion of this category of sins in the causes of tzara’at informs us that harm to another is not the only yardstick of negative social consequences. Society demands structure; sexual impropriety is a challenge to this structure. The affliction of tzara’at may additionally be informing us that parties to such sexual misdeeds, even as they do not perceive themselves to be harmful to each other, may also demand a consequence of isolation for those attempting to destroy the necessary order. Maintaining social order demands much effort. Tzara’at, with its subsequent consequence of isolation, was a direct Divine reminder of this fact.

Rabbi Benjamin Hecht