HUMILITY
The
use of the word na’aseh,
“let us
make”, in Bereishit
1:26 is, simply,
perplexing. Why would God use the plural
form of the verb to describe His
singular actions? Why would he further do
so knowing that this would give force
to those who challenge the very Oneness of
HaKodesh
Baruch
Hu?1 T.B.
Sanhedrin 38b responds to this
latter question by insisting that this
problem should actually not really arise
for Bereishit 1:27 immediately
uses the single construction of a verb
in describing God’s actions. Torah
Temima,
Bereishit 1:26, note 58, however,
maintains, as evidenced by the
use of the singular in both verses of the
Septuagint, 2
that concern should still exist in that
one wishing to find fault can still
raise a challenge. What could possibly
have been so important a message,
incorporated in the plural use of this
verb, so that God was willing to live
with the harm of a potential mistake?
One
approach undertaken to answer these
questions is built upon an understanding
that this was really an act of a “we”. Ramban
argues that God only created something ex
nihilo, from nothing, on the first
day; subsequent creations were all from
created substances. As such, he shows that
previous commands of creation were
actually directions to these created
substances to bring forth new beings; the
process of creation is being described.3
In the case of the creation of Adam, it is
now understandable why the plural
was used. God called upon the earth to
bring forth the created physical
elements from which Adam was to be formed,
as was the case in other aspects of
Creation, but then God would add the soul
anew from the spiritual realm.
According to this approach, “we” is just
keeping in line with the narrative,
expressing fundamental principles in how
we are to approach the Creation story.
The fact that people would make mistakes,
especially given the fact that there
was enough evidence to really dispel these
mistakes, should not cause us to
deviate from an honest depiction of the
creation of Man from two realms, the
physical and the spiritual, which is the
essential challenge that Man must face
and solve.4
Rashi
takes a different approach. He does
not see the language as describing what we
may term an inherent, pluralistic
element of creation but rather admits that
the language is indeed misleading.
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the fact
that this language may be improperly
used by heretics to support their views,
God deemed it important to use this
language in order to teach us derech
eretz, manners and civility, and anivut,
humility. By using the plural, we are
being told that God consulted with His beit
din, His heavenly court, before
creating Man, demonstrating to us that it
is proper for the mighty to gain
permission from the lowly before acting.
Yet, upon reflection, we may wonder
what such behaviour actually entails and
whether it truly is proper. If someone
with more knowledge and ability makes a
decision, is it truly in line with derech
eretz for such a person to
consult and attempt to gain the approval
of one with fewer qualifications?
Could such a scenario not also be seen as
somewhat of a mockery? This verse
cannot possibly mean that God play-acted,
going through the motions of
consulting with His heavenly court, even
though everyone, including this court,
would know the irrelevancy of such an
exercise.
What then is the lesson of derech
eretz and model of anivut
that
this verse is actually imparting?
Rabbi
Shimshon Raphael Hirsch states
that the verse is actually using the royal
we, the pluralis Majestatis. What,
though, is the significance of this
term? Why do royalty speak in the plural?
The use of this term may possibly
indicate that a monarch is not acting in
self-interest but with the interest of
those being governed, “from the point of
view of the general interest, and for
the general well-being and happiness.”
This idea could possibly explain Rashi.5
It is derech
eretz for a ruler to
reflect and project this representation.
He should constantly reinforce to
himself, and in the presence of others,
this recognition. Such language would
also promote anivut
for a ruler,
thereby, would recognize that his subjects
are not there to serve him but,
rather, he is there to serve his subjects.
God, with the use of the plural,
wanted to make it clear that this was not
about Him but about His creation. For
such a purpose, the potential, incorrect
application of the verse by heretics
simply had to be weathered.
Maharal,
Gur Aryeh adopts a different
line of reasoning. Requesting another’s
involvement in a decision or agreement
with a decision would seem to reflect a
possible weakness in the decision. The
message would seem to be that the
decision-maker is requesting more input in
order to ensure that the decision is a
correct one. An argument that one should
do so, even when one does not really need
the input, because of derech
eretz and/or anivut would seem to imply
that one should still give this
impression to others, even when not
necessary, for these reasons. Applying
such reasoning to this case,
though, would seem to be problematic as
presented above. God does not need His beit
din’s input to ensure that His
decisions are correct ones – and the beit
din knows this. In such a case it
would seem to be just a play. Maharal,
though, identifies another reason for why
one may consult others in a decision.
It
may be necessary for those affected by a
decision to also understand the
reasoning behind the decision. In such a
case, it is indeed not enough for the
correct decision to be made but for all to
further understand that it is the
correct decision. It is this further
decision that may be the product of
manners and humility. These are the values
that make us sensitive to the other
and recognize the weakness in imposing our
will, our decisions, upon others and
the need for the other to also understand
the value of the decision. That is
God’s lesson in this case. There was no
doubt that God’s decision was the
correct one. God wanted to teach us,
though, the importance of the other also
knowing the reason. This is humility.6
Rabbi
Benjamin Hecht Footnotes 1 The
Christian concept of the trinity
immediately comes to mind however, this
concern would seem to have pre-dated
even this specific concern and it was
actually more generalized – that this
verse would be seen to give value to
polytheism in general. The famous
explanation of Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot
Avodat Kochavim 1:1,2
as to how idolatry began would seem to
be most on point. 2 See T.B.
Megilla 9a. 3 See,
for example Bereishit
1:24. 4 Various sources, in this
vein, also point to the
plural use of the terms d'muteinu,
forms, and tzalmeinu,
images, which
were intended, as such, to show the
dialectic nature of Man and the bechira,
free choice, that he was given.
Ramban thus points out that Bereishit
1:27 was
then to
show how Man was specifically
distinct. 5 Rabbi
Hirsch actually develops this idea in a
different direction. 6 A similar argument could
be made regarding Avraham Avinu’s
questioning of God at © Nishma 2009
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