INSIGHT 5770 - #19 B’RATZON
There
is a classic statement in Kiddushin 31a that
concludes gadol metzuveh v’oseh yoteir
mi’mi she’eino metzuveh v’oseh, that one commanded who acts in fulfillment
of his/her obligation is greater than one who is not commanded and still
fulfills the command. Rav Yosef, in the gemara,
originally thought the opposite, that one who performs a mitzvah although not commanded should receive a greater reward.
After all, such an individual is performing this deed motivated solely by his/her
own free will and desire; should that not be better than one who acts because
he/she is commanded and thus fearfully obligated to do so? The gemara, however, concludes otherwise. A
possible explanation for this is the one presented by Tosfot, d.h. Gadol based upon the recognition that the one
commanded faces greater worry and anxiety lest he/she does not fulfill the
command and is held responsible. It is in lieu of this greater apprehension
that the act done by the one commanded is deemed to have greater value. In
contradistinction to this principal, though, there seems to be various cases,
such as the one expressed in Shemot 25:2,
which highlight actions done as a reflection of personal desire. It would seem
that, notwithstanding the statement of this gemara,
there are situations whereby an act done not in response to a command has the
greater value. Sridei
Eish 2:46 raises the question of why there is no bracha for the mitzvah of
mishlo’ach manot, especially since the
classic answer of Rashba -- as to
why there is no bracha for giving tzedakah -- would seem to be
inapplicable in this case. Rashba contends, as most understand his argument,1 that
the saying of a blessing is just simply inappropriate when the one doing the
act and, thus, reciting the bracha
does not have full control of the situation. This is the case in such
circumstances as the giving of charity where, to fulfill the mitzvah, the poor person must accept the
gift of tzedakah and, as such, the
potential for fulfilling the mitzvah
is not solely in the hands of the one giving the charity. Until the poor person
legally accepts the gift, there is no mitzvah
of tzedakah. This, however, is not
the case with the mitzvah of mishlo’ach manot, for the mitzvah is simply fulfilled with the
sending of the gift and does not require the acceptance of the gift to define
the act as a mitzvah. Since the mitzvah is, as such, totally in the
control of the one doing the act, the question emerges again as to why there is
no bracha. One of the possible answers presented
by the Sridei Eish builds upon this very issue of the role of personal desire
in the fulfillment of a mitzvah. He
contends that the recitation of a bracha,
with its focus on the fact that this act is commanded by God, clearly reflects
the value of metzuveh v’oseh, that
there is greater value in an act performed in response to a command. He then
contends, though, that this may not necessarily always be the case. The mitzvah of mishlo’ach manot is intended to further feelings of brotherhood,
love and friendship within the Jewish community. Such feelings, the Sridei Eish
contends, emerge to a greater extent when an act is done because of personal
desire and emotions of caring for fellow Jews. Thus, for this mitzvah, it is actually of greater value
when it is performed not primarily in response to the command but because of
personal desire and feelings. As such, the recitation of a bracha would actually be inappropriate in the case of mishlo’ach manot as it would change the
preferred focus of the action. A similar reason can be given for why there is
no bracha when one gives tzedakah, for that action, as well,
should be motivated by personal feelings, in this case, of caring and love. Sridei Eish continues with a
reference to the famous distinction in Rambam,
Shemona Perakim, Perek 6 between chukim,
the commands beyond human reason, and mitzvot
sichliyot, commands which we to understand and internalize. By implication,
he would seem to be inferring that there are mitzvot whereby our focus is to be primarily on the action that is
commanded and, indeed, in such cases the focus of our motivation is to be
centered on the fact that this is a command of God. There are other mitzvot, though, whereby our focus is
not to be primarily on the action per se
but on the motivation and feelings that are to be inherently connected to this
action. In such actions, it would seem, it is, in fact, of great importance
that the action flows from these personal desires, motivations and feelings. In
a certain way, God’s command does not solely concern the action but also the
emotion and reason behind the action – and the development of such emotions and
reasons so that they motivate one to perform the actions of mitzvah is of specific import. In such
cases, indeed, it would be inappropriate to say a bracha thereby stating that one is performing this act solely
because it was commanded by God. It is actually God’s Will that it be performed
because of correct personal desires. This recognition may also be of significance
when we reflect upon our relationship with God. Many are somewhat bewildered by
the view of Ramban, Commentary to Sefer
HaMitzvot, Aseh 5 which contends, in disagreement with the view of Rambam, that there is no Biblical
commandment to pray. How could there be no mitzvah
d’oraita of tefilla? What value,
though, is there in a prayer that is solely motivated by a command and not the
emotion and personal desire to pray?2 There
is, no doubt, a significant value in responding to the tzivui Hashem, the command of God, simply acting because that is
what God demands. Yet, if our entire Torah experience is defined by this one
feeling exclusively, there is much that can and does get lost. In certain
cases, our actions must be motivated by different considerations and, even, personal
desires. This is true in aspects of our behaviour with our fellow man. This is
also true, at times, in our relationship with God. Thus the Torah informs us
that in the building of the Mishkan
it is important to note that the motivation to contribute was personal. Bnei Yisrael gave because they wanted
to,3 they
wanted to express their feelings and desire for HaKodesh Baruch Hu by participating, most generously, in the
building of the Mishkan. There are
times, it would seem, that it is gadol mi
she’eino metzuveh v’oseh; that the one who acts without being commanded may
be greater. Rabbi Benjamin Hecht e-mail Footnotes 1 In this response, the Sridei
Eish will present another way to understand the theory of the Rashba that
bypasses this problem; however that fuller discussion is beyond the parameters
of this Insight. 2 See, also, Avot 2:13 and, even, Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Tefilla 4:15,
however a full discussion of this issue, including, especially, an analysis of
the views of Rambam and Ramban, is also outside the parameters of this Insight.
. 3 See,
further, Rashi,
Shemot 25:2. © Nishma 2010
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