INSIGHT 5770 - #25 THE ESSENCE OF KEDUSHA When
individuals, in the context of a human being, discuss the topic of kedusha,
holiness,1 the
famous words of Ramban, Vayikra 19:2
often serve as a starting point. To Ramban, kedusha
is more a factor of process and personality than the reflection of a specific abstention
from certain objects. It is reflected in the behaviour of the individual in
directing his/her drives, not in the objects upon which restraint is exercised,
that we find kedusha. He thus decrees
that one should strive to reflect holiness not solely through the avoidance of
transgressions but even in the performance of permitted actions. It is, as
such, not, for example, in the specific avoidance of eating non-kosher food
that one becomes holy but rather in the practice of restraint in general.
Striving for kedusha thus does not
mean that one just refrains from transgressions. Holiness is specifically
attained in how one conducts himself/herself in the realm of the permitted. It
is, according to Ramban, in how one eats kosher food -- specifically in how one
expresses restraint in his/her consumption of permitted food -- that one truly reflects
and expresses kedusha. This view is offered by Ramban in
contradistinction to the view of Rashi,
Vayikra 19:2 which is presented as reflecting the view that kedusha is specifically attained through
refraining from that which is prohibited.2 According
to this view, it is specifically through, for example, not eating non-kosher
food that one attains kedusha. Many
contend, however, that this position may still also understand kedusha as a factor of process and
personality and not specifically the direct result of refraining from certain
objects. Kedusha may still be, even
according to Rashi, not the result of specifically abstaining from the object, for
example, pork. It could still be that one attains kedusha as a result of the incorporation into one’s lifestyle the
pattern of behaviour that refrains from consuming forbidden objects. It is the
specific pattern of restraint incorporated in the halachic lifestyle that develops kedusha. Clearly according to Ramban and even possibly according to
Rashi, the point is that kedusha is a
factor of the gavra, the person. It
is in how the process of the laws of the Torah act upon an individual that we
observe kedusha. Ramban defines the kedusha process one way, Rashi another
but both could be understood as focusing on this process. Within this
perspective, it is not the specific object of, for example, pork that
challenges the ability to achieve kedusha.
It is in how we relate to the generic nature of prohibitions -- and, according
to Ramban, how we extend them or, according to Rashi, how we balance them with
the permitted – that we find holiness. The fact that the call for the Jewish
People to strive for kedusha in Vayikra 11:44 is preceded by the
prohibition of bal tishaktzu, not to
act disgustingly by eating creeping insects, would seem, however, to challenge
this understanding. The focus in these verses would seem to be on the object
upon which restraint is exercised, not simply on restraint. It would seem,
according to these verses, it is specifically in refraining from that which is
disgusting that one expresses kedusha.
The focus thus changes to the object, the cheftza.
Kedusha is attained through
specifically staying away from certain objects, not necessarily in the process
of restraint practiced by an individual. The affect of the behaviour is only
secondary. The key would seem to be in maintaining distance from the specific
negative object. This understanding of kedusha would seem to find support in the more mystical
explanations for the prohibitions relating to food, namely that non-kosher food
negatively affects the soul. Kedusha,
by extension, could thus be one of the positive results of simply refraining
from consuming that which is not kosher. This explanation would seem to be
further buttressed by the categorization of the laws of prohibited foods as chukim, laws which have no rational
reason. We don’t know and can’t really feel how refraining from non-kosher food
affects us and, thus, also do not really understand kedusha. It is simply the product of separation from certain
objects. The problem with this perspective is that
the prohibition of bal tishaktzu does
include a human response. The emotion of disgust is tied to the behaviour; it
is in the refraining from that which elicits the emotion of disgust, it would
seem, that one also finds kedusha.
While the specific object that is the focal point of the behaviour does play a
significant role in this definition of kedusha,
it is still the behaviour that is the heart of the consideration. Kedusha is found in refraining from that
which we find disgusting. It is found in the human formulation of the feeling
of disgust and the reaction of separation. It could be contended, though, that the
Torah’s use of a word reflecting disgust does not refer to our emotional
understanding of this word but rather to a more objective, mystical
understanding of this word. Such a perception would again take the concept out
of the realm of our understanding and demand of us a focus on the object of
restraint rather than our motivations for restraint. The extension, however, of
the prohibition of bal tishaktzu to
include the refraining from any disgusting behaviour would seem to challenge
such a position.3 Even if this extension is
only of a Rabbinic nature, the fact that the Rabbis saw some measure of the
emotion of repulsion in even the basic Torah law would seem to support the
perception that kedusha is tied to
process. It is in how we consciously develop our personalities that we find kedusha, not simply in how we allow
directed Torah behaviours to, without consciousness and especially without
consideration, affect us. We must consciously be part of the process of
developing kedusha. Chai Hecht e-mail Footnotes 1 While we will also use the
English terms holiness and holy as translations for the words kedusha and kodesh, it should be noted that while this is the prevalent custom,
the Torah values and ideas reflected in these terms are actually most unique
and distinctive. 2 It is of interest to
perhaps note that as Rambam gave the
name Kedusha to the section of his Mishneh Torah containing the laws of
forbidden foods, Hilchot Ma’achlot
Asurot, and the laws of forbidden sexual relations, Hilchot Issurei Bi’ah, many assume that he also actually shares
Rashi’s view. 3 See, for
example, T.B. Makkot
16b which directs individuals not to drink, even water,
from a cup that was used to hold liquids the drinking of which would repulse
people. 4 Torah Temima, Vayikra 11:43 presents a
disagreement as to whether the extension of bal
tishaktzu to include a prohibition on all disgusting behaviours is Rabbinic
in nature or part of the original Biblical law. He personally sides with the
former. In any event, this machloket,
as will be pointed out, does not substantially affect the verse’s effect on our
understanding of kedusha. © Nishma 2010
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