BECHIRA In
regard to a vast number of mitzvot,
we find that one of the essential purposes of the mitzvah is to foster a remembrance of Yetziat Mitzrayim, the Exodus from Shemot 6:7, 7:5 are two verses that
clearly state that God’s very purpose in performing the miracles of the Exodus
was to establish, both amongst the Jewish People and amongst the Egyptians, the
reality of His Being and His Existence. It would seem that, for everyone who
witnessed the events of the Exodus, one of the necessary outcomes was that
there was no doubt about God and that it was important to God that, at least at
some point in history, this was presented to Mankind.4
The problem that many have with such a recognition, though, is that, it would
seem, such surety about God would also challenge the concept of bechira, free choice.5
How could one, knowing full well of the Existence of God, challenge His
command? As
such, in order to maintain the possibility of bechira, counter-arguments exist that maintain that, in regard to
whatever God did, there also had to be possible ways of explaining what
occurred without reliance upon the intervention of an Omnipotent Divinity. Such
a concern has led people, for example, to attempt to find possible natural
explanations for what occurred.6 Interestingly, Rabbi Yaakov Kamenetsky, Emet L’Yaakov, Shemot 7:22, in explaining
why there is no longer any magic today, states that it was only when there were
open miracles that magic existed, for magic was then necessary to maintain the
possibility of bechira. As such, bechira could also exist after the
Exodus, even as it was seen to be wondrous, because of the possibility that a
contention of magic could be voiced to explain what occurred in a different manner.
Yet, such an assertion takes us full circle, for the very purpose of the
miracles of the Exodus was, it is maintained, to unequivocally reveal God. Our subsequent
question must be: is it really true that bechira
is only possible because of doubt? Rambam, Mishneh Torah, Hilchot Yesodei
HaTorah 8:1, indeed, challenges the idea that the miracles of Yetziat Mitzrayim established the truth
without any doubt for there would still always be the question that perhaps
they were the product of some magic. Nevertheless, he also still maintains that
there was a point in history that the truth, without any doubt, was presented.
To Rambam, however, this occurred at Har
Sinai and, as such, he asserts that no one who witnessed Revelation ever
questioned it. Are we then to maintain – is it even possible for us to maintain
– that those who were at Har Sinai no
longer had bechira?7
It must be that, at its very core, bechira
can exist even without any doubt about God. The
concept that one cannot be punished by a court unless the person is first
warned that the act that he/she is about to do is in violation of the Torah and
then states, in response, that he/she accepts this obligation to be true, would
seem to also indicate that bechira is
not dependent on doubt. Doubt is actually a defense. Rosh, Mo’ed Katan 3:59 writes that the very punishments of the
court are specifically because one is defying God, not because of succumbing to
passion. If the person was performing the act due to passion, why would he/she respond
to the warning of the witnesses, especially knowing full well that without a
response the court cannot punish? It must be that the person wishes to defy God
without any doubt that he/she is doing so. At its core, bechira must mean that the human being has some type of drive to
defy God even knowing full well the truth of His Existence. It is this drive that is at the essence
of bechira.8
The
reality is, however, that it would still have to take a great amount of
fortitude for someone to defy God in full recognition of His Presence. The true
rasha, evildoer, must, as such – and
it is strange even to state this – be a person of great strength. For the vast
majority of us, however, the possibility of sin only exists because of doubt.
Otherwise, we could not even contemplate doing an act that would defy God.
Interestingly, though, this very doubt may also be our defense. Rabbi
Benjamin Hecht Footnotes 1 See Rabbi Shimshon Raphael Hirsch, Horeb, Edoth
2:23. 2 His
explanation is psychological. The greater the amount of activities that are
undertaken with a certain focus, the greater one will be affected by this
focus. As such the more that is done to establish the memory of Yetziat Mitzrayim, the more one will
incorporate this memory. 3 To
clarify, the Chinuch’s question seems to be why there are so many mitzvot with the specific purpose of
remembering Yetziat Mitzrayim. He
enumerates, for example, 15 mitzvot connected
with observances practiced on Pesach,
such as the prohibition of chametz
and the detailed commandments involved in the
korban Pesach, .that
specifically emerge from a connection with the Exodus Ramban’s question seems to extend beyond this, wondering why there
are so many mitzvot which would seem
to have nothing to do with Yetziat
Mitzrayim -- such as, for example, tefillin,
which are the specific mitzvot Ramban
is commenting upon here – yet the Torah still connects to the remembering of
the Exodus. 4 There
are many subsequent questions that emerge from such an assertion – such as why
this was only necessary and, indeed, only occurred once in history – but they
are beyond the parameters of this Insight. 5 In
that we are told – for example, in Shemot
9:12, in the context of the sixth plague -- that God hardened Pharaoh’s
heart, that is, removed free choice from him, perhaps this should not be seen
as a problem in this context. Perhaps God knew that presenting His Existence
with such surety would challenge free choice but, nonetheless, this was God’s
intention at this time. The problem, however, is that such surety would present
a challenge to free choice well beyond the time frame of the Exodus. The
question, thus, is: how could anyone who experienced the miracles of the Exodus
ever again experience bechira? 6 See,
also, Ramban, Shemot 14:21. 7 Rabbi Yaakov Weinberg asked a similar,
yet still somewhat different question, in that he queried how Korach could
later challenge Moshe Rabbeinu, for
the specific truth to which the Rambam is referring is that of Moshe’s
prophecy. 8 The
subsequent need would be to explain such a drive and from where it emerges,
given that it would seem to be totally irrational. I leave that, at this time,
for the reader to contemplate. © Nishma 2012 Return to top |
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