INSIGHT MISTAKE,
SIN, NEITHER: OR ALL? The
story of Nadav and Avihu found in Vayikra
10:1-7 is most fascinating in its presentation of the conflicting nature of
these figures as discussed in the sources. Who were Nadav and Avihu? Why did
they do what they did? The answers presented seem to paint distinct and even
contradictory pictures, with further questions then developing as to the exact
reason for God’s powerful response in destroying these men through a fire that
ate their souls.1 Vayikra
10:1 states that Nadav and Avihu improperly lit a fire in the service of
God. T.B. Eruvin 63a, however, states that their real sin was that they
rendered a halachic decision independently of their teacher, Moshe. Pursuant
to this gemara, the real problem was thus not
that they lit their own fires but that they made this decision to do so without
asking Moshe. Before deciding what to do, they should have asked Moshe (since it
was possible for them to do so). Maharsha, however, finds a problem with
this for, in lighting their own fires, they were actually following the general
instructions that they had already learning from Moshe, namely that the kohanim are to light
the fires of the service. Thus, they seem to have acted correctly, just doing
what their teacher had taught. Maharsha then goes on to explain why what they
did was wrong. Torah
Temima, Vayikra 10:2, note 2 wonders, however, why
Maharsha must conclude that Nadav and Avihu’s halachic analysis and
behavior must have been wrong to render them guilty of deciding a matter without
their teacher. A student should still not render a decision in front of his
teacher even if the student is correct.2
The propriety of the subsequent action has nothing to
do with the issue of rendering a decision independently. As such, Nadav and
Avihu being right or wrong has nothing to do with the impropriety of their
rendering a decision given that they could have asked Moshe. The further
problem, though, is that the verse specifically notes that the fire they lit
was a foreign one, implying that it was not proper to have lit this fire. They
must have thus done two things wrong: made an independent halachic
decision in the presence of their teacher and, in that their conclusion was
incorrect, subsequently acted improperly. But what was the essential fault --
that they lit this fire, or that they rendered a decision without Moshe?2 The
verse points to the action but the gemara points to their independent
behavior without Moshe. There
is actually a major qualitative distinction between the problem of lighting a
foreign fire and the problem of rendering a decision overlooking one’s teacher.
The former, most likely, flows from an intellectual mistake; the latter, most
likely, reflects a character weakness. When we are told that Nadav and Avihu
lit a strange fire before God, we think that they made a mistake. They somehow
made a decision to do something and that this decision was wrong. In fact, both
Maharsha and Torah Temima, in trying to explain the verse’s statement that
Nadav and Avihu brought a strange fire, attempt to explain the faulty reasoning
of Aharon’s sons. Left alone, the verse seems to be saying that Nadav and Avihu
were punished for their behavior, caused by rendering a poor decision and thereby
making an intellectual mistake. The
gemara, in raising the issue of the presence of
Moshe, however, introduces the issue of character. For faulty reasoning, this
punishment would seem quite harsh. A lack of respect for Moshe, coupled with a
lack of humility in the brothers, would indeed further explain the punishment;
the fault was not just an intellectual mistake but a character sin. The
challenge is, though, that the verse itself does focus on the mind’s mistake. It
may still be that this mistake was still only so punishable because of its
roots in a character defect. One may wonder, though: if this character defect
did not stretch to the manifestation of such an adverse conclusion, would it
have been similarly punished? What is of the essence, intellectual mistake or
character sin? Rashi,
Vayikra 10:3 introduces yet another approach in explaining the fate of
Nadav and Avihu -- that they were human sacrifices offered in the dedication of
the Mishkan because of their high level.3
It was not any weakness in Nadav and Avihu that led to their fate but rather it
was actually a consequence of their goodness and their high level. This,
obviously, would seem to be a different approach than the one presented above –
but differing approaches always exist within Torah so this should not, in
itself, be an issue. The problem, though, is that Vayikra 10:1,2 says explicitly that they were punished for doing
something wrong. Another problem is that Rashi himself also quotes the gemara in Eruvin that Nadav and Avihu were
punished for not asking Moshe. So what was the further cause of Nadav and
Avihu’s deaths – mistake, sin or their exalted status? It seems somehow all –
but how is this possible? Rabbi Benjamin Hecht Footnotes 1 See Rashi, Vayikra 10:5.
2 It is
possible, however, to understand Maharsha’s words somewhat differently and that
he was not challenging this basic idea that one, even if correct, should not
render a decision before his teacher. Maharsha may have been wondering how
Nadav and Avihu could be described as rendering a decision before their teacher
when they were in fact just following the instructions they had already learned
from their teacher, Moshe, in regard to lighting fires in the Mishkan service.
The issue, though, was that the circumstances, in this particular case, were
somewhat different than the circumstances assumed when this general law was
first taught – there was now a fire from Heaven on the alter. Given these
changed circumstances, their decision to maintain the law as they were taught
it was a case of them rendering a decision anew in the presence of their
teacher. The implication within the Maharsha, though, is still somewhat in line
with the understanding of the Torah Temima that part of the problem for the
Maharsha, in Nadav and Avihu’s rendering of a decision before Moshe was that
their decision was wrong. It may be, though, that Maharsha, in the same way as
Torah Temima does, is trying to explain both – that Nadav and Avihu improperly
rendered a decision before their teacher and that they also brought a foreign
fire. 3 This,
of course, begs the question of why God would demand the sacrifice of good
human beings in this sanctification process. We will, however, not be directly dealing
with this question in this Insight. 4 As
Rashi says, Moshe pointed this out to Aharon to comfort him through the
recognition that Nadav and Avihu were even greater than their father and uncle.
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