Natural and ImpositionIn encountering an individual, we have identified a variety of factors that would necessarily contribute to our understanding of how to relate to this person. In terms of the present study, we have described three specific categories that should be included in our focus. One is the generic category of "human being" that identifies characteristics that are present in all humans (or the greater majority). Second are the groupings of "male" and "female" which, again, reflect our attempt to distinguish particular characteristics that uniquely apply to the great majority within a specific type. Third is the "individual" qua individual, the marked characteristics of this particular person. While the focus within a study of gender is on the attempt to define the characteristics that distinguish the different groups within category two, i.e. male and female, such a study would be inadequate without a consideration of both the nature of the broader category from which these two divisions occur, i.e. humanity, and a consideration of the unique nature of the individuals which comprise the distinct groups. It is thus necessary, in evaluating any concept encounted within this study to consider how such a presentation affects our understanding of the nature of human beings in general and of singular individuals. For example, the famous statement from T.B. Nidah 45b that women were given an extra measurement of bina, understanding, would demand of us to question how this concept relates to the description of bina within humanity in general and also how it relates to distinctions in bina between individuals. Does this statement, for example, mean that all women have more bina than any man? If not, how do you respond to the man who has more bina than many women or the woman who has less bina than many men? If the distinction in bina is thereby reduced to a realm of individual distinctiveness, what then is the import of this statement regarding gender? (Of course, to fully investigate this subject one would also have to define bina.) These types of questions would emerge within any study of gender, A Torah investigation of the topic, though, must also address another issue. The Torah's objective is not solely to describe what already exists but also has an intent to affect change. In regard to any mitzvah the question can thus be asked whether the mitzvah is intended to respond to the temperment of people or whether the mitzvah is intended to create an ideal temperment albeit that it contravenes human nature. As such, an investigation of Torah statements regarding gender would have to include the question of whether the statement reflects the already existent nature of man and/or women OR whether the statement is indicating what God desires from each sex whether this distinction is already inherent or not. Of course, there may not be one answer, across the board, for all the statements on this subject. For example, in regard to the statement in T.B. Nidah 45b, quoted above, the gemara specifically mentions that "God gave" thus indicating that this statement is describing an already present reality, i.e. that women have an extra measurement of bina. But this is not necessarily the case in regard to all statements made in regard to distinctions in gender. At times the Torah statement may be only instructional declaring what should be but not necessarily what is. The result of this realization is manifold. In the general study of gender roles, research on the actual feelings or skills of the different sexes will be most important in directing how society or the individual should respond to them. With this recognition, the connection between such studies and the Torah perspective is much looser. Even a discovery that women and men have exactly the same disposition in regard to a specific matter would not have a direct result on a halachic distinction that is already existent. A new question, though, does arise: if men and women are inherently the same, why would God distinguish them -- or more precisely, why would God impose a distinction? A possibility may be that God perceives such a distinction to serve the society. How we explain the distinction between a kohain and a regular Jew may be approached in a similar fashion. Does this distinction reflect an inherent difference between the two and, as such, there is something inherent in the kohain's nature that makes him more suited to the priesthood? Or is there no real inherent distinctiion between kohanim and regular Jews but God felt it necessary to create, in the interests of society, such a distinction? Asking a similar question in regard to the gender distinctions within Halacha opens up many new issues that need to be investigated in regard to the subject. An important one of these issues, that would have to be addressed, revolves around the effect of such imposed distinctions upon the individual. If we say that halachic distinctions reflect inherent differences between the sexes than there is a greater chance for one to be at peace with these distinctions. Afterall, if they reflect the true nature of the person, they actually are mapping out the way for personal fullfilment as well. We may still ask the question whether these differences reflect distinctions in apptitude or interest yet, still, oftentimes apptitude and interest do go together. The result is that the difference in God's directions can be simply explained as reflecting what one is good at and what truly offers personal fullfilment. Still, even if it only reflects what one is good at, it is easy to explain why God would want someone to undertake this function (albeit we could still ask why God did not make this behaviour the road to personal happiness as well). If we state,though, that the halachic distinctions are imposed without consideration for the nature of the person, the question emerges as to why God would make such impositions upon an individual -- specifically at the expense of this individual's personal happiness. Of course, a powerful side issue within this investigation would be the Torah value of personal happiness. Nevertheless, the recognition of this possibility is an important one to consider. It opens the possibility that any distinction in gender is not tied to actual distinction already existent but, rather, is simply what the Torah wants to exist. It also discounts any challenge to such an assertion based upon the personal fullfilment of the individual. This actually has a tremendous effect on our entire understanding of mitzvot. If we state that mitzvot are in line with human nature, then we can expect a life of mitzvah observance to lead to some level of satisfaction as we act in line with our nature. If we, though, state, that mitzvot are not necessarily in line with human nature -- and that the specific roles of men and women within Torah are not necessarily in line with a generic understanding of gender nature -- we can expect tension to be a natural result of a life of mitzvah observance, almost as part of the Divine intention. The opens much to contemplate. Of course, another possibiity is that the goal is actually to change our nature and a life of mitzvah observance is intended to create a specific nature. Seen this way, a life of mitzvah observance could still lead to personal fullfilment but it does so by changing the criteria for such fullfilment and our nature. Previous Topic: Male and Female Back to Issue One: Group and Individual |
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2005 NISHMA